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Question 
To what extent does the Algerian Security Sector (including counter-terrorism measures, and 
with particular attention to the Army) support (or undermine) Algeria’s stability? 
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1. Summary 
Algeria faces a broad range of security threats, including terrorism, instability in neighbouring 
countries, drug trafficking and ethnic tensions. While the Algerian armed forces play an important 
role in combatting these threats, they also contribute to instability. Key findings from the literature 
include: 
 The army continues to have significant influence on political decision-making. Efforts to 
curb this influence have had a limited impact, and are often described as superficial in 
the literature. 
 In the M’Zab region, the heavy security presence has reinforced ethnic tensions between 
Ibadite Berbers and Arab-speaking populations. 
 Corruption in the military undermines public trust in the security forces and potentially 
contributes to instability. 
 While Algeria uses a broad range of counter-terrorism measures, it lacks a 
comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy. 
While there is a significant body of literature on the Algerian security sector, much of the 
literature does not explicitly address the impact of the security sector on stability in the country. 
The literature search conducted for this report did not identify any rigorous evidence-based 
papers on this subject. Rather, the literature consists largely of opinion pieces by think tanks. For 
the purposes of this report both English and French language literature was reviewed.  
2. Security forces 
The research undertaken for this report uncovered no rigorous evidence or analysis on the link 
between the security forces and stability, nor any analysis focusing specifically on the navy or the 
air force. The literature reviewed focuses largely on the army and the intelligence services. 
There is consensus in the literature that the Algerian armed forces are by far the best performing 
security forces in Africa (see for example NATO, 2016, p. 3 and Gaub, 2015, p. 3). However, 
figures for the size of the defence forces vary considerably. According to NATO the armed forces 
are 512,000 strong, with an additional 400,000 reservists (NATO, 2016, p. 3). However, 
according to a briefing paper published by the European Union Institute for Security Studies, they 
number 130,000 (army – 110,000, navy – 6,000, and air force – 14,000) (Gaub, 2015, p. 3). 
Algeria has compulsory national service as well as a well-organised professional officer corps. 
Women are represented in all the armed forces, but only men have to undertake compulsory 
military service (NATO, 2016, p. 4). 
Algeria faces a number of security threats including terrorism, instability in neighbouring 
countries, ethnic tensions, and drug trafficking. According to the Bertelsmann Stiftung, the 
Algerian government has identified drug trafficking as a key security threat. This threat is 
perceived to be even greater than that posed by militancy in the region, to which it is linked. The 
Algerian army has been responsible for fighting trafficking in the Sahara in particular since 2013 
(2018, p. 31). Algeria’s efforts to counter terrorism are discussed in Section 3. 
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Role of the military in politics 
According to a report published by the Carnegie Middle East Centre, Algeria’s military is the 
principal holder of national power. Various articles refer to the army’s role in political decision-
making. The degree of influence attributed to the army varies with some papers claiming that the 
army takes political decisions and the government implements them (Ghanem-Yazbeck, 2018), 
while others state that the army just influences decision-making (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p. 
10). 
 
The military has reportedly ‘rejected any civilian effort to oversee internal military affairs, 
define national security policy, make military officers accountable to civil courts, or diminish the 
military’s political functions.’ Algerian presidential candidates require the military’s approval. This 
means that presidents must have the support of the leaders and representatives of the army and 
they have to share power with those that helped to bring them to office (Ghanem-Yazbeck, 
2018). Ghanem-Yazbeck attributes the army’s political power to the legitimacy it gained from 
leading Algeria’s bid for independence, arguing that this led to the military becoming identified 
with the nation itself (2018).
 
 
Since the 1991 military coup the army’s intelligence services remained effectively independent 
and they were referred to as ‘le pouvoir’ along with clans within the military. ‘Le pouvoir’ is 
described as an ‘economic mafia’, which retained political control ‘behind the scenes’ 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p. 10). However, in September 2015, President Bouteflika 
dismissed the head of the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS), Mohamed Mediene, 
who had been in this post for 25 years. In January 2016, Bouteflika abolished the DRS 
altogether, replacing it with the Security Services Department (DSS), a body under presidential 
control (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p. 11). According to a briefing paper published by the Center 
for Security Studies, these measures have given the President room for manoeuvre when it 
comes to the army. However, it argues that the armed forces continue to view themselves as 
guarantors of stability and unity in the country and still play a discreet role in political decision-
making (Watanabe, 2017, p. 3). Others argue that despite its significantly increased budget, the 
military now interferes less in governance in Algeria. This is however qualified by the point that 
certain elements of the military, which benefit from the current economic and political system, are 
widely viewed as an obstacle to further liberalisation (ACLED). 
Increased ethnic tensions as a result of security presence 
Ongoing tensions in the M’Zab region between Ibadite Berbers and Arabic- speaking populations 
have reportedly reduced in recent years, with no violence having been reported for over a year 
due to an increased security presence. However, according to the Bertelsmann Stiftung ‘the 
security services’ apparent bias against the Ibadite youth has reinforced ethnic cleavages and a 
sense of injustice for them at the hands of the state’ (2018, p. 34). They note that, according to 
observers, the causes for the tensions are more connected to trafficking and illegal trade across 
the whole region rather than real ethnic divisions (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018, p. 34). 
Incomplete reconciliation 
The 2006 Reconciliation Charter is widely viewed as having brought peace to Algeria. However, 
the amnesties given to state security forces and terrorists continue to be seen as being unjust, 
especially by the families of the 100,000 victims of the conflict and by those of the 8,000 
“disappeared.” Moreover, compensation has not led to genuine reconciliation as families of 
victims still want to know the truth about what happened to the victims (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 
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2018, p. 35). Amnesty International states that in order for there to be genuine reconciliation, 
existing provisions in the legislation granting immunity to security forces and state armed militias 
for serious human rights violations and criminalising public criticism of the conduct of the security 
forces should be repealed. They also state the need ‘full, impartial and independent 
investigations into cases of enforced disappearances and unlawful killings; to clarify the fate of 
victims of enforced disappearances and to provide their families with an effective remedy’ to be 
conducted (2016, p. 6). 
Corruption 
Citing data from a report published by Transparency International, the Armed Conflict Location 
and Events Database (ACLED) states that ‘unchecked military spending and widespread 
defence corruption are undermining public trust in the government and in its armed forces, while 
feeding arms proliferation, organised crime and regional instability.’1 
3. Counter-terrorism measures 
While there is a significant body of literature on the counter-terrorism efforts being undertaken by 
the Algerian government, this does not cover the impact that these strategies have on the 
country’s stability. 
Algeria uses a range of strategies to counter terrorism. These include:  
 providing social services and family outreach to at-risk youths in the country 
 a development plan and a comprehensive national reconciliation policy 
 reinforced protection for its energy facilities, new military observer posts, and working 
cooperatively with neighboring governments, including Tunisia, to streamline information 
sharing regarding international smuggling operations and transnational terrorist activity. 
 new laws have been added to the Algerian Penal Code that expand punitive measures 
for crimes related to financing, supporting or acting as foreign fighters, and the use of 
technology for terrorist recruitment purposes. Algeria has also taken steps to crack down 
on Internet service providers who do not comply with legal obligations to store 
information or withhold access to criminal material 
 the government has encouraged imams who have defected or ‘repented’ from terrorist 
groups to share religious explanations for the illegitimacy of their former terrorist groups.  
 the government has also actively promoted more ‘moderate’ imams, and created a 
national television agency and radio station that promotes government-approved 
interpretations of Islam. The government also exerts significant control within mosques 
throughout the country. All imams in Algeria must be approved, trained, and employed by 
the country’s Ministry of Religious Affairs and Endowments. There are fines and prison 
sentences for anyone who preaches at a mosque that has not been approved by the 
government.  
 The government has set up an ‘anti-suicide bomber’ programme, and has actively 
worked to promote non-violent strains of Salafism and Sufism.
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Despite all these measures the Counter Extremism Project states that Algeria lacks a 
comprehensive strategy to counter terrorism, and that the balance of power within military and 
counterterrorism institutions remains unclear.
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